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RECENT DECISIONS
Domestic Relations-The Effect of Support Orders on Subse-
quent Marriages-The deceased and the appellant, his first wife,
were divorced in Wisconsin, January, 1961. The court awarded the
custody of the minor son to the appellant and ordered the deceased
to pay monthly support. At the time of the divorce the deceased was a
resident of Wisconsin and remained such until his death in July, 1962.
Prior thereto, in March of 1962, the deceased married the respondent
in IMichigan. After the marriage, the couple returned to reside in Wis-
consin. The deceased faithfully continued the support payments up
until the time of his death.
The first wife in the case of In re Fergusen's Estate,1 petitioned the
court to declare that the respondent was not the widow of the deceased,
to remove the respondent as administratrix, and to order an accounting
of the respondent's administration.
The appellant based her petition on section 245.10 of the Wisconsin
statutes,2 which in effect declares that a person who has been divorced
and ordered by the court to support minor issue of a prior marriage,
may not be remarried without the permission of the court. The ap-
pellant's former husband, the deceased, failed to obtain such permission
prior to his second marriage in Michigan.
The trial court held that the second marriage of the deceased was
not void but voidable and therefore not subject to collateral attack after
the death of one of the parties. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin af-
firmed, with one dissenting vote, the lower court's decision on the
ground that section 245.10 had no extraterritorial effect and did not
apply to the Michigan marriage.
The court's decision is only the second instance of an interpretation
of section 245.10 as amended in 1961, the first being an opinion with
125 Wis. 2d 75, 130 N.W. 2d 300 (1964).
2 VVs. STAT. §245.10 (1963): "When either applicant has minor issue of a
prior marriage not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support
by court order or judgment, no license shall be issued without the order of
a court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of application. The court,
within 5 days after such permission is sought by verified petition in a special
proceeding, shall either grant such order or direct a court hearing to be held
in the matter to allow said applicant to submit proof of his compliance with
such prior court obligation. No such order shall be granted, or hearing held,
unless both applicants for such license appear, and unless the person, agency,
institution, welfare department or other entity having the legal or the actual
custody of such minor issue is given notice of such proceeding.by personal
service of a copy of such petition at least 5 days prior to the court order of
hearing, unless such appearance or notice has been waived by the court upon
good cause shown. Upon the hearing, if said applicant submits such proof
and makes a showing that such children are not and are not likely to be-
come public charges, the court shall grant such order, a copy of which shall
be filed in any prior divorce action of such applicant in this state affected
thereby; otherwise permission for a license shall be withheld until such
proof is submitted and such showing is made, but any court order withhold-
ing such permission is an appealable order. Any marriage contracted without
compliance with this section, where such compliance is required, shall be
void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere.
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reasoning similar to the lower court's by the Wisconsin Attorney Gen-
eral.
3
The reasoning of the court may be divided into four principal parts:
(1) Section 245.10, as created in its basic form in 1959, was merely
prohibitory. It did not declare a marriage in violation of its terms void,
but only declared that a marriage license should not be granted if the
proposed marriage did not comply with the terms of the various statutes.
Therefore, it could properly be compared with section 245.02, the
minimum age for marriage provision, and section 245.06, requiring ante-
nuptial examinations. All of these statutes were addressed to license
availability, that is, they were prohibitions placed upon the issuance of
marriage licenses by the county clerks, and not directed to the parties
themselves. Due to such a similarity, the court held it was proper to
apply the rule of Lyannes v. Lyannes4 to section 245.10. In Lyannes,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the minimum age statute and
the antenuptial examination statute, being addressed to the county clerks
of Wisconsin, were non-extraterritorial in effect.
(2) The court, while apparently recognizing some similarity in the
wording of 245.03(2) ,5 the one year waiting period statute, to section
245.10, was quick to point out that the provisions of the two statutes
were completely different in their effect. Thus, the court was able, with
consistency, to affirm Lanham v. Lanham' which declared that section
245.03(2) should be given extraterritorial effect in voiding marriages
entered into by Wisconsin residents within a year from a prior divorce.
(3) The court then addressed itself to the problem of how to treat and
dispose of the statutory words "or elsewhere." They accomplished this
by merely stating that such statutory words could not be construed as
requiring compliance in another state.
(4) After arriving at the conclusion that section 245.10 should not be
given extraterritorial effect, the decision tried to explain why section
245.04, the marriage evasion act,7 should not be construed so as to give
section 245.10 extraterritorial effect. This was accomplished by simply
holding that the marriage evasion act applied only to statutes which
have extraterritorial effect. The court again relied on the Lyannes case,
3 52 A.G. 175 (Wis. 1963).
4 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920).
5 WIs. STAT. §245.03(2) (1963) provides: "It is unlawful for any person, who
is or has been a party to an action for divorce in any court in this state, or
elsewhere, to marry again until one year after judgment of divorce is granted,
and the marriage of any such person solemnized before the expiration of one
year from the date of the granting of judgment of divorce shall be void."
6 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908).
7WIs. STAT. §245.04(1) (1963): "If any person residing and intending to
continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contract-
ing marriage under the laws of this state goes into another state or country
and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared void under the laws
of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this state with
the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state."
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and held that statutes which only prohibit marriages and do not void
them, should not be given extraterritorial effect under the marriage
evasion act."
I. STATUTORY AMENDMENT
Section 245.10 in its 1959 version, could properly be compared with
section 245.02, the minimum age for marriage provision and section
245.06, the antenuptial examination statute. Until 1961, the statute was
purely prohibitory and directed only to the county clerks. Therefore,
it was proper to contend that the statute should be considered limited
in its application to the state of Wisconsin. It would have been un-
reasonable to hold that a Wisconsin law directed to the county clerks,
should be considered applicable to the licensing agencies of other states.
However, the majority's application of the Lyannes rule after the 1961
amendment of section 245.10 seems improper. In 1961 the legislature
added the sentence, "Any marriage contracted without compliance with
this section where such compliance is required sluili be void, whether
entered into in this state or elsewhere."9 [Emphasis added.] Thus, the
statute is no longer merely a prohibition directed to the county clerk,
but is now also directed to the parties of such intended marriage by
a declaration that attempts at such marriages will be void. This amend-
ment would seem to render inappropriate the court's reliance on the
Lyannes case which dealt with statutes having no provision for any
effect outside the boundaries of Wisconsin, nor for holding marriages
in violation thereof void.
II. COMPARISON WITH THE ONE YEAR WAITING PERIOD STATUTE
It is certainly true that section 245.10 and section 245.03, the one
year waiting period provision, are different in substance. The recogni-
tion of the extraterritorial effect of the one year waiting period statute
seems to flow inevitably from the nature of the provision. In effect, a
divorce in Wisconsin does not dissolve the marriage until one year
after its judicial obtainment. For this reason, it makes no difference
where the divorced persons wander, for they cannot be validly married
under the laws of any state within the one year period. Even though
section 245.10 does not have such an innate reason for being given
effect outside of Wisconsin, it should be pointed out that the wording
of these two statutes is very similar. While it is true as the court de-
clared, that section 245.03(2) is directed only to the parties themselves
and 245.10's greater bulk is directed to the marriage licensing agency:
it should be noted that the 1961 amendment is not directed to the county
clerk but to the parties and remains the only other marriage statute
besides 245.03(2) to use the words "void" and "or elsewhere." Because
8 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920), supra note 6.
9 Prior to 1959, 245.10 dealt with prenuptial examinations, but in 1959 the
statute was repealed and recreated by WXis. Laws 1959, ch. 595, §17. In 1961 the
section was repealed and recreated by Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 505, §11.
19651
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of this obvious resemblance it would not be unreasonable to contend
that the legislature intended both statutes to have the same extent of
enforcement, that is, extraterritorial force-
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The court in holding section 245.10 inapplicable to marriages per-
formed outside of Wisconsin, was confronted with the problem of
construing the statutory terms "or elsewhere" as not being intended to
have extraterritorial effect. The court accomplished this feat, by merely
holding that you cannot read the terms as requiring compliance in an-
other state. Certainly such a course of reasoning runs contra to well
established rules of statutory construction.
In U.S.F.G. Co. v. Smith0 the court declared:
Although it is the primary rule of construction to give effect to
the legislative intent, yet if a statute is plain and unambiguous
then interpretation is unnecessary. It is not the function of the
court to add language to a statute or to add exceptions because
the statute may to the court seem unwise.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MARRIAGE EVASION ACT
The court having introduced a construction of section 245.10 which
rendered it non-extraterritorial in effect, was faced with the task of
determining whether section 245.04, the marriage evasion act, rendered
marriages performed outside of Wisconsin in violation of 245.10, void.
The act provides in effect that marriages celebrated outside of Wis-
consin by persons intending to reside in Wisconsin are void for all
purposes in Wisconsin if such a marriage is "prohibited or declared
void" under Wisconsin law. The argument that the marriage evasion
act has no application to section 245.10, because the act applies only to
statutes which have extraterritorial effect seems to beg the question.
The court's concept of the nature of the marriage evasion act was ex-
pressly borrowed from the Lyannes case. At the time the Lyannes case
was decided, the marriage evasion act provided :11
[A]ny person residing or intending to reside in this state . . .
who goes into another state and there contracts a marriage pro-
hibited and declared void under the laws of this state, such mar-
riage shall be void for all purposes in this state .... [Emphasis
added.]
Therefore, the statute as worded at the time of tht Lyannes case
held void only these marriages by Wisconsin residents performed out-
side of Wisconsin which were both prohibited and declared void by
Wisconsin law. But chapter 595, section 9, of the Laws of Wisconsin
1959 changed the "and" to "or." Such a change would seem to indicate
all marriages now contracted in violation of any of the Wisconsin mar-
10 184 Wis. 309, 199 NAN'. 954 (1924).
11 W¥is. STAT. §2330(m) (1) (1919).
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riage statutes i.e., prohibited marriages, are void under the marriage
evasion act if entered into by Wisconsin residents in another state.
V. VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
The trial court, by a mysterious semantical technique, reached the
conclusion that the term "void" in section 245.10 means voidable. While
the supreme court did not openly espouse such a construction, it
affirmed the decision without any attack upon the trial court's definition
of "void." It might be argued that the silence of the court upon such
matter is in effect an affirmation of the reasoning of the trial court.
If the court's silence is not treated as a confirmation of such a con-
struction of the term void, its failure to comment on the matter certainly
leaves the issue awkwardly hanging in mid-air. The trial court's con-
struction of the meaning of the unambiguous term "void" is but an-
other example of statutory construction by courts to produce a desired
result.
Once it is admitted that the marriage is only voidable and not void,
it is a rule of law that the marriage can be attacked only directly and
while the parties thereto are alive.12 Under such an interpretation, the
appellant could not properly have brought her action since it only at-
tacked the marriage collaterally and then only after one of the parties
to the marriage was deceased.
The construction of the term voidable by the trial court is contrary
to the express provision of section 245.002(3) of the Wisconsin statutes,
which declares, "In this title 'void' means null and void and not void-
able." Therefore the lower court by its decision tends to promote that
which section 245.002(3) was created to prevent, namely, confusion
of the use and meaning of the terms void and voidable.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY
Even though the supreme court declared that it was not denying
that the public policy expressed in section 245.10 might be promoted
by non-recognition of foreign marriages in violation of the section and
that its decision was based solely on the inadequacy of the statutory
language to accomplish such; it would be reasonable to contend that the
court's reasoning came about in reality to promote the public interest
as they saw it. It is extremely doubtful whether section 245.10 would
be operational and given effect in all foreign jurisdictions. It also seems
inappropriate to void a marriage under the facts of the Ferguson case.
The father had faithfully supported the child and a stipulation was
made that the child was not likely to become a public charge. The public
policy which the legislature sought to adhere to finds expression in the
specific purpose for the creation of the statute-to protect the children
12 In re Romano's Estate, 40 Wash. 2d 796, 246 P. 2d 501 (1952) ; Christensen,
144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W. 2d 613 (1944); Patey v. Peaslee, 99 N.H. 335, 111
A. 2d 194 (1955).
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of a previous marriage and to "emphasize the responsibility of support
of the present family before new obligations are incurred."'13 There-
fore, it would seem appropriate, if not essential, that the legislature
should make specific provisions for a father who performs his obliga-
tions or for situations where the child is, for other reasons, not likely
to become a public charge.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the majority's motive for its holding that "void" means
"voidable" and its assertion that "or elsewhere" means anything but
a reference to states other than Wisconsin, may be laudable, its method
of action seems improper. Admitted, the statute as created, is appar-
ently too harsh for application in a case such as here, and possibly not
operational in some jurisdictions; it is not the function of the judiciary
to construe statutes contrary to their express provisions. It is the func-
tion of the legislature and not the judiciary to create and revise statutes.
If a statute does not constitute an expression of public policy, it is for
the legislature to rectify the situation by modifying or deleting such
legislative creations. The court has gone far beyond the order of section
245.001 which declares that chapter 245 "be liberally construed to effect
the objectives of . .. stability and best interest of marriage and the
family. .. ." I
It would therefore seem imperative that the legislature should make
a reevaluation of section 245.10 so as to determine whether the statute
as created should stand or be transformed so as to tend to foster results
such as in this case. In such a reevaluation the legislature must deter-
mine whether the price for violation of the section should properly
be a void or only a voidable marriage. It must also be determined
whether harsh sanctions should apply where there is no danger the child
will become a public charge. Perhaps the other means of insuring the
support of the child, such as the support decree with its means of
judicial enforcement, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act,14 and the penalties provided under section 245.30(1) (f) 15 are
adequate safeguards without resort to a section such as 245.10. The
legislature should also consider the practical question of whether the
procedural arrangement of the statute will be given operational effect
in other jurisdictions, and if not, the effect of only partial recognition
by other jurisdictions upon the fulfillment of the statutory purpose.
DAVID W. LEIFKER
13 Bill No. 151 A., proposed 1959 by The Legislative Council of 'Wisconsin-
Note p. 14.
14 WIs. STAT. §52.10 (1963).
35 VTis. STAT. §245.30(1)(f) (1963) provides a fine of not less than $200 nor
more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both for
"Any person who obtains a marriage license contrary to or in violation of§245.10, whether such license is obtained by misrepresentation or otherwise,
or whether such marriage is entered into in this state or elsewhere."
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